Findings show that EU-China close relationship is particularly based on goods trade especially on intra-industrial trade of manufacturing industrial products, and trade imbalance is arising from trade in Machinery and Transport Equipment and Other Manufactured Goods (e.g., Clothing and clothing accessories); This paper also found that there exist a myriad of trade and investment barriers to EU-China interactions
Introduction
China"s development in the past decades has caused fierce attention from all over the world. As a country who has more than 1.3 billion population, its annual average economic growth is over 10% (real GDP growth) in the past 30 years, from 1980s to 2000s. Undoubtedly, China"s economic boom particularly gains from his Reform and Opening-up policies starting in the end of 1970s. In the third plenary session of 11 th central committee of CCP held in 1978, Chinese government decided to quit the idea † Zheng Lu, School of Economics, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China. E-mail: zluecon@gmail.com. This paper is revised and improved based on a presentation in the course The Political Economics of European Integration instructed by Prof. Bahri Yılmaz, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, Turkey. I am grateful to the comments and advices from Prof. Bahri Yılmaz.
of "economy subject to politics" and transformed to reform the economic system as well as to open the "Country"s Gate" to the world, since then, promoting economy development became the core task of government. Opening-up policy firstly applied to eastern coastal regions in 1980s and then enlarged to entire country in the early of 1990s, yet CCP proposed to give up Planned Economic System partially and try to build Socialist Market Economic System in 1992. Easily government and enterprises found that China hold strong advantage of labor force comparative with other countries, thus export-oriented strategy became the prior tactic of economic development under the condition of insufficient domestic demand.
Finally, exports became one of the three driven factors (consume, investment and export) of China"s economic growth in the past decades. Proportion of total exports and imports to GDP and of total exports to GDP were just 12.54% and 5.97% in 1980, and then they increased to 29. 78% and 15.99% in 1990 78% and 15.99% in , and 39.58% and 20.80% in 2000 78% and 15.99% in . In 2006 , these two proportions reached the highest points, 65.17% and 35.87%.
Since the global financial crisis exploding in 2007, China"s exports trade was affected significantly by the global economic crisis, the proportion of total exports and imports to GDP and proportion of total exports to GDP reduced in recent years, but they still stood at 50.28% and 26.68% in 2010. Moreover, government also launched many preferential policies, such as income tax exemption or reduction, for attracting foreign capitals to invest in China. Actual utilized FDI was only $3.49bn in 1990, and increased to $40.72bn in 2000, it reached $105.74bn in 2010
1 . These facts adequately proved that international economic and trade interactions are exactly very important to China"s economic development.
Nowadays China has been the second exports economy and third imports economy in the world. And, as the largest exporter and importer in the world, EU has been an important export destination and source of imports and FDI of China. By
March 2004, European Union (EU) became the largest trade partner of China and
China turn to the second largest trade partner of EU (Dai, 2006 (Dai, 2006) , this advantage makes China can produce merchandises with much more lower cost, and at the same time, Chinese government also support export through subsidy, exchange regulation and some other policies, yet some industries are still not open to foreign investment. EU sets some barriers to trade and investment, and also keeps some restriction on sensitive products, the main instruments are technical barrier to trade (TBT) and anti-dumping measures (Brülhart & Matthews, 2007) . This paper will briefly investigate the overview of EU-China economic relations through introducing the status quo and barriers of EU-China trade and investment.
The first section will introduce the bilateral governmental interactions, the second section will analyzes the status quo of EU-China trade and investment, and it will mainly focus on the industrial structure of EU-China trade. The third section will discuss various trade and investment barriers to EU-China through some cases. And the final part is the conclusions and remarks. China and EEC established diplomatic relations in 1975, and in 1985, EEC (Table 2) . By a specific classification of industries, main contributors to 2010 EU"s trade deficit with China are (Appendix Table 2 Table 1 ). From the perspective of EU-China goods trade, it also can be found that EU and China export and import manufacturing industrial products from each other. In 2010, EU-27 exported €69.61bn Machinery and Transport Equipment to China, which accounted for 61.45% in total exports to China.
EU-China Bilateral Governmental Interactions
And China exported €144.99bn Machinery and Transport Equipment to EU, which accounted for 51.32% in total exports to EU. Sum up Machinery and Transport Equipment and Other Manufactured Goods, EU-27 exported €88.12bn to China, the share reached 77.80%, and China exported €263.31 to EU, the share reached 93.20% in 2010. Imports products of EU and China from each other reflected the same status (Table 2) . To some extent, these evidences exactly proved that, as the same as world trade trends which have been proved by Krugman"s New Trade Theory, EU-China trade takes place particularly on intra-industries. This conclusion is also proved by Beneyto et al.(2011: p.17) , whose analysis used a quantitative method based on EU"s member state trade with China, calculation showed Intra-Industrial Global Trade Index with China of selected EU member states increased dramatically from 1995 to 2009.
EU-China Services Trade and Capital Flows
Other dimensions related to economic relations are services trade and capital mobility. Chinese are willing to register companies in international free ports, because it is easy to register and also can get benefit from tax avoidance, and then, if they go back to invest in China, they can enjoy the preferential policy of supporting FDI (income tax exemption or reduction, as for investing in industries which is in the official encourage list, income tax will be exempted in the first three years and half income tax will be levied in the subsequent two years). Anyway, goods trade is the leading role of EU-China economic and trade relations rather than capital mobility and services trade. 
Trade and Investment Barriers between EU and China

Attitude Determines Action
China"s market is important to EU"s products, and EU also would like to gain deserved benefits from the economic boom of China, thus general speaking, EU"s attitude of economic interactions to China tends to be more liberal. But in fact, EU"s decision is based on the common actions of member states, those states who play a leading role was the common decision maker to a great extent.
Figure 2. EU Member States Attitudes to China
Sources: Fox & Godement (2009, p.4) .
EU member states can be divided into four types in term of their attitudes to China (Fox & Godement, 2009: p. China is perhaps the best case of openness and growth in the past decades due to its positive reform on economic system, pricing mechanism and trade system, especially China government implemented a strong policies to support export in order to develop economy (Lardy, 2003) . EU"s huge market is very attractive to Chinese products, China wants to maximize its benefits from EU"s market, and at the same time, to protect its domestic industries as well. Fox and Godement (2009) (Table 4 ). Discussion will not describe or evaluate their effect on EU-China economic interactions, but prove that these barriers indeed exist and cannot be ignored. 
Tariff Barriers
Coming with globalization trends, every country has realized the importance of free trading, both developed and developing countries have been reducing their import tariff rate recent decades, thus the importance of tariff barriers has declined or it is not a key obstacle to free trading in the future. In terms of a measurement, EU-15 average tariff rate on import goods from external countries was 1.54% by 2002 (Global Britain, 2004) . Towards to China"s import tariff rate, China actually began to reduce after implementing opening-up policy and it dropped sharply in 1990s in order to access to WTO, the average import tariff rate stood at a very high level, more than 50% in 1982, it reduced to 40% in 1993, and then dropped to 15.3% in 2001 (Lardy, 2003; SCIO,2011) . After accession to WTO, China continued to reduce the tariff rate according to the commitment, average tariff rate decreased to 9.9% in 2005 and 9.8% in 2010(SCIO, 2011).
Therefore, Ashton (2009) argued that trade and investment barriers between EU and China are not those arising from tariffs already, but those caused by non-tariffs fields, such as various rules and standards. However, it seems inaccurate to claim that there are no tariff barriers to EU-China trading. In fact, tariff is still treated as a useful instrument by both EU and China. Generally EU imposes a higher tariff on products, especially on basic goods (such as foods and textile, which developing country have an advantage) from developing countries than on products from developed countries. Mullally, O"Brien & Stephenson(2005) found that rich countries(GDP per capita is more than £15000 a year) just faced an average 1.6% tariff imposed by EU, middle income countries were imposed an average 2.9% tariff, while poor countries(GDP per capita is less than £5000 a year) were imposed an highest tariff rate, 5% on average.
Imposing discriminatory duties on products from different income countries implies China is suffering a higher trade defense from EU than other rich countries.
A frequently-used approach of EU to China is to levy anti-dumping duties on products importing from China. Taking the anti-dumping duty on China"s ceramic tiles as an example, after one year investigation(from April 2009 to March 2010), EU decided to impose a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ceramic tiles originating in China, this highest duty rate reached 73%(EU Commission, 2011a). On 12 September, EU published a definitive anti-dumping duty rate, the highest one reached 69.7% (EU Council, 2011a). EU stated that China"s ceramic tiles products exactly sold as a lower price in EU than that in China domestic market and products of EU"s companies and finally injured EU"s related industries. Nevertheless, a research report stated that export prices from China are highly differentiated and most of Chinese exporters sold at a higher price than those companies of many EU member states, and China"s products only shared 6.5% in EU market, while EU producers shared 90%, thus EU"s anti-dumping measures are inappropriate (Kasteng, 2012) .
As for anti-subsidy duties EU imposing on China"s products, there are some cases too. On 6 May 2011, EU commission published the first anti-subsidy tariffs against imports from China after 15 months investigation, EU stated that Chinese government subsidized coated fine paper industry by giving cheap loans, cheap land and some preferential tax policies which are illegal under WTO rules, then EU decided to impose anti-subsidy duties on coated fine paper from China with duties ranging from 4% to 12% (EU Council, 2011b) . At the same time, EU also decided to impose anti-dumping duties on coated fine paper with duties ranging from 20% to 39.1% (EU Council, 2011c) . This implies that EU imposes both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on the same product (coated fine paper) imported from China. Of course, EU"s action caused a protest from China, Chinese government argued that imposing both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on the same product is a double remedial behavior to EU industry and it goes against the WTO rules.
As a response to EU"s actions, Chinese government launched some anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures on EU"s products and has begun to impose anti-dumping duties and anti-subsidy duties on some products imported from EU as well. For example, on 6 February 2007, China started to impose anti-dumping duties on potato starch imported from EU with duration of 5 years. China decided to recheck and still levy anti-dumping duties during rechecking period; And on 23 January 2011, Chinese government decided to impose anti-dumping duties on X-Ray security equipment imported from EU with duties ranging from 33.5% to 71.8%. On 16 September 2011, China decided to impose anti-subsidy duty on potato starch from EU after with a duty ranging between 7.5% to 12.4%, it is also the first time to impose anti-subsidy duty on EU product, and in fact, on 19 April 2011, China has began to impose anti-dumping duty on the same product from EU with duty ranging from 12.6% to 56.7%. Moreover, as mentioned previously, China"s import tariff rate is still higher relatively, although it will continue to decrease in terms of the commitment to WTO rules, it is also can be treated as a tariff barriers to trading.
In sum, although there are some other kind of anti-dumping measures, such as warranting deposit, price commitment during the investigation, some rules and standards, EU and China governments still treat imposing duties as an important remedial measure and exert on goods trade frequently in order to protect domestic industries or as a reaction to anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures from opposite side. Therefore, tariffs, including normal duty as well as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are still the barrier to EU-China trade, which exactly cause profit loss of consumers as the conclusion has been proved by classical trade theory.
Non-Tariff Barriers
Non-tariff barriers refer to the barriers such as import quotas, subsidies, rules, standards and regulations, which a country or a region who uses a common external trade policy used in order to protect domestic industries, Non-tariff barrier has been a most preferable and popular measure used by governments in modern world.
Naturally, EU and China government also prefer to exert non-tariff barriers on each other"s trade and investment.
Subsidy measure is mainly exploited by EU on agriculture through the framework of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP targets to promote European agriculture sector development more productive and stable through some support measures such as direct payment, market price intervention, production quotas and so on. EU budgets a lot annually for supporting and protecting agricultural development. For example, it is embraces approximately 90% of EU"s agricultural output, and about half of EU"s budget was paid to agriculture sector in 2001 (Wickman, 2003: p. Although CAP expenditure reflected a descending trend, it doesn"t imply that the direct subsidy measure will be forgone. According to "CAP towards 2020", direct payment will still be used to support agriculture producers who, EU argued, "face very economic and natural conditions across the EU which advocates for an equitable distribution of direct aids" (EU Commission, 2010) . CAP subsidies to farmers caused negative effect to EU consumers as well as foreign countries. EU consumers have to pay 80%-100% more for food than those in free-market regime, and because of the high import tariff and export subsidies of EU, agriculture sector of developing countries also was shocked obviously (Wickman, 2003: p.3) . Some studies argued that CAP subsidies actually failed to protect farmers" income which fell 70% between 1995 and 2000, and the main beneficiaries were input suppliers and big landowners (Mullally, O"Brien & Stephenson, 2005: p.11 ).
Another frequently-used non-tariff measure by EU is technical barriers to trade (TBT), which targets mainly are based on the requirement, for example, for health, safety, environmental, consumer protection. TBT includes two types according to makers, the one is imposed by government, and the other one is imposed by non-governmental organizations (Brenton, Sheehy & Vancauteren, 2001; Brülhart & Matthews, 2007) , here it just discusses the former type of TBT exploited by EU. EU commission and council published many directives or standards in recent years, they are mainly related to health, safety and environment concerns. For example, "Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals" (REACH), which was launched in 2006, provides the framework for chemical industry with a purpose of protecting environment and human health, it implies that all foreign exporters have to comply with the technical standards as well as register and test according to a certain procedure. Although REACH regulation of EU is good for protecting human health and environment, it may cause some negative impact on third countries trading with EU in short term if they cannot find corresponding solutions, for instance, it would increase export costs of third countries" enterprises, and also may hit related industries of third countries especially developing countries whose technical level and test conditions are very poor. Therefore, if there is no deferential treatment for different countries, the negative impact of REACH on developing countries would much stronger than those on developed countries. EU arms embargo against China started in 1989 as a response to Chinese pro-democracy movement. EU stated that there still exist human rights abuse and security threatens nowadays, thus the arm embargo continues to be maintained.
However, recent years EU member states have began to discuss whether embargo should be ended, but they confront serious pressures from US and Japan (van der Putten, 2009).
As regards China, it has a long tradition of supporting domestic industries development, this is reflected in various five-year plans, including Five-year Plan of national economic and social development, Five-year Plan of sectoral development as well as Five-year Plan of various industries. China"s central and local governments tend to pay subsidies in order to reduce the financial costs of enterprises, for example, if some high and new technology industries are in the encouraging category of government, central and local budget will arrange corresponding special subsidies to enterprises, scope embodies such as loan interest subsidy, technology update and innovation subsidy, talent subsidy and so on. Specially, China government built a export tax rebate(ETR) system in 1985 in order to boost exports trade, which includes VAT(Value Added Tax) drawback and consumption tax drawback. Total value of ETR grew very fast after accession to WTO due to the export growth, figure was about $7.57bn in 1999, and increased to $94.96bn in 2009. ETR rate has been adjusted several times and current ranging is between 5% to 17%, the most recent adjustment was made in 2009 taking into global financial crisis shock account, which increased the rebate rate of some products such as TV transmitting equipment and sewing machine (rose to 17%), some agricultural processing products and electromechanical products(rose to 15%), Corn starch and alcohol(rose to 5%). Except for some observable subsidies, there are also some hidden subsidizing actions which can create positive effect on export indirectly. Here picking a recent case as a example for discussion (Box 1), in April 2012, South Korea company, SAMSUNG decided to build production base of Nand Flash, it will produce core processor for iPhone and iPad. There are three alternative regions who want to obtain this project since it can create jobs as well as GDP. Finally this project landed in Xi"an, Shanxi Province due to the local government"s exciting supportive policies.
Supportive policies included not only direct investment subsidy and income tax exemption, but also free land provision and operating cost subsidies. Yet local government committed to build required transportation access to the plant. Actually, the production of this project is just the sub-unit of iPhone and iPad, while the final products will be produced by another assembly foundry of APPLE INC., FOXCONN which will locate in Chengdu, Sichuan province(Chengdu is a city close to Xi"an, Chengdu local government also provides abundant supportive policies to the project).
After FOXCONN"s production base in Chengdu comes into work, it will produce 2/3 of iPad in the world, it implies most of these products will be exported to extra-China countries. Undoubtedly, local government"s support to export-oriented industrial investment, in fact, forms a indirect subsidy to China"s exports.
Quotas and Certification regulation are also the traditional non-tariff instruments used by Chinese government. China set a Quota & License Administrative Bureau attaching to Ministry of Commerce to manage trade quotas and licensed affairs.
Quotas and license covers both export and import trade, for example, quotas of raw materials exports and of wool as well as wool top imports, license of partial steels exports and of food processing and packaging equipment. Some of China"s export
Box 1. Case of Chinese Local Government Actions for Attracting Investment
In April 2012, SAMSUNG decided to invest a Nand Flash(core processor for iPhone 4S and iPad2) Project in Xi"an, Shanxi Province, China. the total investment is over $30bn (about RMB200bn), it will create lots of outputs and employments.
What did the local government do in order to get this project? Why SAMSUNG decided to land in Xi"an but not other tow alternative places, Beijing and Chongqing?
Followings are the policies of Xi"an municipal government to SAMSUNG:  Financial subsidies to SAMSUNG: 30% subsidies of total investment;  Preferential Income Tax policies: 10 years exemption and 10 years half reduction;  Required Land and Plant Buildings: Free land; Plant Buildings will be built by government;  Auxiliary policies: RMB0.5bn subsidies per year for the cost of water, power, afforesting and logistics; government will be responsible for highway and metro access to plant. This decision of Xi"an caused significant critiques from Chinese people, because it spends too much public resources on this project. Similar decision happens frequently in China, local governments always provide strong support in order to attract investment including FDI.
Take SAMSUNG project as an example, this project will produce the core processor of iPhone and iPad. At the same time, FOXCONN(contracted with APPLE INC.) has decided to build a plant in Chengdu, Sichuan Province(produce iPad; total investment is over $10bn), this plant will produce 2/3 of iPad in the world. Chinese cannot buy all of them, it implies 2/3 of iPad consumers in the world whose iPad are Made in China. So, there is no doubt that such kind of subsidies will indirectly create positive effect on China"s export trade. Chinese quotas and export duties on some raw materials products are illegal as well (EU Commission, 2012 ). Yet China"s exchange regulation creates import and export effect. China"s exchange rate system is Managed Floating Rate System, which make Chinese government can intervene in exchange market if it is required. Therefore, Renminbi can maintain a higher value to exchange US dollar through governmental controlling, it implies value of Renminbi is much lower than that of other currencies, which will promote exports and restrict imports. Chinese enterprises and government benefit from the Managed Floating Rate System directly, but it is not conducive to other countries exporters. So, exchange regulation is always criticized, and other countries have been pressuring Chinese government to lessen regulation and let Renminbi appreciating. Transparency is also one of the main principles according to WTO provisions. Non-transparency laws and regulations can create trade barriers especially to imports. After accession to WTO, China have made a big efforts to reform and improve its administrative transparency in terms of its commitment to WTO, for example, publishing regulations, establishing Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure(SPS) system, as well as related laws and standards (Biuković, 2010) .
However, some research stated that there still exist some non-transparency regulations especially in the sector of industry investment (Kraft, 2010; EU Commission, 2011b , 2012 .
Additionally, here it treats anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations corresponding to dumping and subsidy as the non-tariff barriers to trade as well.
Actually, dumping is always created by some supportive policies such as various subsidies and tax exemption which finally reduced the production cost of enterprises.
EU"s agricultural policies and China"s industrial policies or exchange regulation make their products can sale much cheaper in abroad. As a response to dumping, both EU and China start to exploit anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations on each other"s products. If they confirm that a certain product exists dumping and impose duties on this product, then imposing anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties further become tariff barriers. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation can be treated as non-tariff barriers too, government can pressure on exporters through investigations even if dumping action may not true. Moreover, they also may be used as retaliatory measures. For example, as discussed previously, EU started its anti-subsidy investigation on coated fine paper from China in the early of 2010 and finally decided to impose anti-subsidy duties On 6 May 2011 (EU Council, 2011b) , which is the first time that EU impose anti-subsidy duties on Chinese product. Subsequently, on 30
August 2010, China government started the first anti-subsidy investigation on potato starch from EU and finally decided to impose anti-subsidy duty on 16 September 2011. It is worth noting that EU impose both anti-dumping duty and anti-subsidy duty on the same product, at the beginning, Chinese government argued that it violated the WTO rules, while finally China government started to impose both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on the same product as well. These interactions indicated that China"s action could be a retaliatory response to EU"s action. In 2012, EU launched anti-subsidy investigations on several products from China and also caused the protest from Chinese government, if EU finally confirms to impose, probably China will respond as the same actions.
Investment Barriers
Cross-border investment has developed rapidly in the past decades. In order to promote capital flowing across board, developed countries, who have a strong advantage on capital, have been making considerable efforts to prevent developing countries from foreign invest investment(FDI) restrictions. Actually, from the historical perspective, now-developed countries systematically restricted foreign investment for protecting domestic industries through various measures, such as limits on ownerships, technology transfer, local procurement, mergers and acquisitions regulations and so on. Only when domestic industries got strong and competitive enough, now-developed countries started to lessen their regulation on FDI (Chang, 2004) . Therefore, generally developing countries have stronger restrictions on foreign investment than developed countries.
However, developed countries still restricted FDI in some sensitive sectors in terms of their concerns of national safety or public interest. EU member states mainly exert reviews on some merger and acquisition (M&A) related to national safety or public interest, namely they tend to intervene in FDI market through the National GAO(2008, p.8) and Kern(2008, p.34-38) .
Comparative with European countries, China exerts much stronger restrictions on China also built and launched a National Security Review System in February 2011, which stated that it requires to be vetted by government if the M&A by foreign investors is related to national security.
Conclusions and Remarks
In terms of analysis above all, this paper finds that: EU and However, above analysis is just a rough introduction of EU-China economic and trade relations ("Economic Partnership"), it didn"t introduce the "Economic Competition" between EU and China. Actually, according to the arguments of EU commission, relations between EU and China are Competition and Partnership (EU Commission, 2006) , which is not only in economic fields but also in political and social fields. Another topic is that this paper just focused on the bilateral relations at the supranational level, while in fact, as argued by Dai(2006) , relations between EU and China involves not only bilateral relations at supranational level(EU-China) but also bilateral relations at member state level(relation between EU"s every member state and China). Thus if one wants to understanding EU-China economic and trade relations completely, it is necessary to consider the performance arising from the second type of bilateral relations.
